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Explicating Fairness-Trust-Loyalty Relationships in a Supply Chain 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
This study seeks to understand if the two dimensions of fairness—procedural and 
distributive—contribute differently in fostering the two types of trust—credibility and 
benevolence.  Further, we examine how the two dimensions of trust mediate the fairness-loyalty 
relationship. Using data from retail pharmacies in the healthcare supply chain to test our 
hypotheses, we find that procedural fairness appears to be more important than distributive 
fairness in generating credibility-based trust, whereas distributive fairness is more important in 
garnering benevolence-based trust. Also, procedural fairness fosters trust-credibility more than 
trust-benevolence, whereas distributive fairness garners trust-benevolence more than trust-
credibility. Further, trust-credibility is found to partially mediate the relationship between 
procedural fairness and loyalty, and trust-benevolence fully mediates the distributive fairness-
loyalty relationship.  The theoretical and managerial implications of these findings are discussed 
in the paper. 
 
Keywords: Supply Chain Management, Trust, Fairness, Loyalty, Mediating Effects 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the current hypercompetitive environment, firms are increasingly utilizing supply chain 
partnerships as sources of competitive advantage. To gain a competitive edge, firms are aligning 
with both inbound and outbound supply chain partners, making it one of the main characteristics 
of a successful business (Lambert and Cooper 2000). Fostering superior relationships between 
supply chain members creates a win-win situation for both the buyer and supplier firms (Paulraj 
and Chen 2005). Alignment of the supply chain depends on effective management of supplier-
buyer relationships. The outbound part of the supply chain, which includes wholesalers and 
retailers, plays a key role in delivering the perfect order to customers (Lejeune and Yakova 
2005). Firms are increasingly placing greater strategic importance on customer retention and 
loyalty management.  
 The concept of fairness has long been suggested as important in creating effective 
relationships (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Frazier, Spekman and O'Neal 1988; Kaufmann and 
Stern 1988; Anderson and Weitz 1989, 1992; Gundlach and Murphy 1993; Griffith et al. 2006). 
Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995) found strong evidence that vulnerable buyers' perceptions 
of fairness (both distributive and procedural fairness) were positively related to the perceived 
quality of the relationship with their suppliers. We attempt to extend this research stream further 
by examining the alignment between the two dimensions of fairness (procedural and distributive) 
with the two dimensions of trust (credibility and benevolence). Further, building on the existing 
research on the level of commitment and trust in buyer-supplier relationships (Morgan and Hunt 
1994; Kwon and Suh 2005), we posit that trust intervenes between fairness and loyalty. 
The specific purpose of this study is to: (1) understand if the two dimensions of 
fairness—procedural and distributive—contribute differently in fostering the two types of trust—
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credibility and benevolence, and (2) examine how the two dimensions of trust mediate the 
fairness-loyalty relationship.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Fairness-Trust Relationships 
In the channels literature, the concept of fairness has been studied for developing effective 
channel relationships, as mentioned earlier. Research on organizational and social justice has 
identified two distinct categories of fairness: distributive fairness, that is, the fairness of 
outcomes received, and procedural fairness, the fairness of process (Tyler and Lind 1992). 
Distributive fairness refers to the buyer's perception of the fairness of earnings and other 
outcomes that it receives from its relationship with the supplier. Distributive fairness "relates to 
the division of benefits and burdens" (Frazier, Spekman and O'Neal 1988, p. 60), and can be 
viewed as an evaluation of the channel partner’s relative rewards (or losses) in comparison to the 
respective contributions or inputs (Frazier 1983). Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp (1995) defined 
distributive fairness as a firm's comparison of its actual outcomes to those outcomes the firm 
deems it deserves. Procedural fairness refers to the buyer's perception of the fairness of the 
supplier's procedures and processes in relation to its buyers (Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 
1995).  
Trust has two distinct dimensions: (1) trust-credibility, which is based on the extent to 
which the buyer believes that the supplier has the required expertise to perform the job 
effectively and reliably, which is the cognitive dimension of trust and (2) trust-benevolence, 
which is based on the extent to which the buyer believes that the supplier has intentions and 
motivations beneficial to the buyer when new conditions arise for which a commitment is not 
made (Ganesan 1994), which is the emotional aspect.   
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Trust is a key element in the emergence and maintenance of social exchange 
relationships. One source of trust in exchange relationships is fairness (Lind and Tyler 1988). 
Signaling fairness appropriately in exchange relationships can reduce the firm’s fear of other 
firm’s opportunism, which paves the way for a trusting relationship. Thus, fairness, in general, 
leads to trust, but do both dimensions of fairness equally help develop the two dimensions of 
trust?  
Suppliers with fair procedures and practices (procedural fairness) in place develop a 
reputation for fairness (credibility) within the industry (Anderson and Weitz 1989). Suppliers 
with a reputation of fairness develop greater trust-credibility in their relationships with their 
buyers (Ganesan 1994). On the other hand, suppliers that lack procedural fairness are less likely 
to develop trust-credibility in their relationships with buyers (Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 
1995).  Further, procedural fairness has a more enduring quality (Tyler and Lind 1992); it can be 
easily monitored and evaluated because it involves specific actions on part of the supplier. Thus, 
procedural fairness facilitates the buyer’s assessment of the supplier’s expertise to perform the 
job effectively, which more effectively serves to build credibility-based trust than the 
benevolence-based trust since the latter is a function of the buyer’s belief of the supplier’s 
motivations and intentions.  
Kumar et al. (1995) have shown that distributive fairness positively impacts relationship 
quality, of which trust is one component. We, however, surmise that trust-benevolence is 
reflected more through caring actions on part of the suppliers, by following through and actually 
sharing the benefits with the buyers (i.e., distributive fairness), and not so much through the 
existence of fair procedures and processes (i.e., procedural fairness). Researchers have theorized 
that perceived injustice in outcomes received will result in unfavorable affective reactions 
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(emotions) and conflict within channel relationships (Frazier 1983; Frazier, Spekman and O’Neal 
1988). Thus, distributive fairness is more likely to affect buyers’ perceived intentions and 
motivations (trust-benevolence) of the supplier rather than buyers’ perceptions of the supplier’s 
expertise to perform the job effectively (trust-credibility). 
 Assessment of distributive fairness takes more effort and development of relational 
bonds in the exchange. Distributive fairness signals emotions that help foster the buyer’s belief 
in the supplier’s intentions and motivations of equitable, compassionate treatment (trust-
benevolence) in future transactions for which a commitment is not made. Such emotions do not 
have as strong an effect in cultivating credibility-based trust, which is facilitated more by 
specific, measurable actions of the supplier. Thus, 
H1a. The positive effect of procedural fairness will be stronger on trust-credibility than 
that on trust-benevolence. (PFTC > PF TB) 
 
H1b. The positive effect of distributive fairness will be stronger on trust-benevolence than 
that on trust-credibility. (DF TB > DF TC) 
 
H1c. The positive effect of procedural fairness on trust-credibility will be stronger than 
that of distributive fairness. (PF TC > DF TC) 
 
H1d. The positive effect of distributive fairness will be stronger on trust-benevolence as 
compared to that of procedural fairness. (DF TB > PF TB) 
 
Mediating Effects of Trust  
 
Based on an extensive review of the literature on buyer-supplier relationships, Terpend et al. 
conclude that “future research needs to …focus more on the potential for practices and mutual 
efforts to mediate…as well as directly effect…” (2008, p. 42). Our attempt to establish the 
mediating role of trust is key to understanding the process of developing loyal relationships in a 
supply chain. “[F]ailing to include their [mediating variables’] effects in such studies would 
result in flawed conclusions regarding not only the direct impact of relationship commitment and 
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trust on important outcomes, but the impact of other antecedents as well” (Morgan and Hunt 
1994, p. 31).  
Some researchers have suggested that fairness (distributive and procedural) is needed to 
earn long-term customer loyalty (Seiders and Berry 1998, Blogett, Hill and Tax 1997), indicating 
a direct effect of fairness on loyalty. For example, procedural fairness could be quickly 
recognized by the buyer early in the relationship, and it could help foster the buyer’s loyalty. 
This argument is grounded in the referent cognitions theory (Folger 1986), which suggests that if 
a supplier treats his/her buyers well, this will in the long run lead to a positive effect on the 
buyers’ dedication to, identification with, and internalization of—or loyalty to—the supplier.  
Trust can lead to the commitment of both the supplier and the buyer to the exchange 
relationship. At that point, the supplier and buyer are likely to work diligently at preserving their 
relationship investment by cooperating with one another. Trust leads to the sort of cooperative 
behaviors that facilitate relational exchange (Pelton, Strutton and Lumpkin 1997).  
We argue, consistent with Wong et al. (2002), that when the buyer perceives the 
supplier’s practices and processes to be fair and consistent (procedural fairness), the buyer 
develops confidence in the supplier’s expertise to perform the job effectively (trust-credibility) 
and, as a result, the buyer is more likely to rebuy from the supplier. Such customer trust in the 
service provider has been observed to increase commitment to the relationship with the service 
provider (Moorman et al. 1992, 1993; Grayson and Ambler 1999). Kwon and Suh (2004) found 
that a firm’s trust in its supply chain partner is associated with increased specific asset 
investment and reduced behavioral uncertainty. This influence is supported by social exchange 
theory as increments in trust serve to increase the social embeddedness of the relationship, 
thereby reducing the propensity to leave. Thus, 
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H2a. Trust-credibility will fully mediate the relationship between procedural fairness and 
loyalty. 
 
When the buyer perceives a fair division of benefits and earnings with the supplier 
(distributive fairness), s/he becomes more confident that the supplier will perform in a way that 
is beneficial or at least not detrimental to his/her interests (Gambetta 1988). Thus, when the 
buyer is confident about the good intentions of the supplier (trust-benevolence), the buyer is 
more likely to develop a loyal relationship with the supplier. Such feelings of confidence 
alleviate the fear that the supplier will act opportunistically (Bradach and Eccles 1989), which 
help develop a relationship based on trust-benevolence. This trust strengthens the bond between 
the buyer and supplier, which manifests in the form of buyer’s loyalty to the supplier. We 
hypothesize that, as benevolence-based trust develops in a relationship, it becomes the essence of 
the relationship and behaves as the key governance mechanism in the distributive fairness-
loyalty relationship. Thus, 
H2b. Trust-benevolence will fully mediate the relationship between distributive fairness 
and loyalty. 
 
METHOD 
Sample and Data Collection 
 
We tested our hypotheses with a sample drawn from the retail pharmaceutical industry that deals 
with pharmaceutical wholesalers. Pharmaceutical wholesalers play a critical role in the 
distribution of prescription products, because about 80 percent of the products flow through the 
wholesalers. The sampling frame was obtained from state departments of licensing and 
regulation. Because it is mandatory that all pharmacies in each state register and obtain a license 
to operate, this list was the most comprehensive and accurate and included all types of 
pharmacies (e.g., independent, chain, food and drug combination stores, etc.) in each state.  
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Telephone prescreening of a random sample drawn from the sampling frame was 
conducted in order to: (a) identify the owner/manager, (b) seek prior commitment to participate 
in the mail survey, (c) identify the supplier that served as the referent for that pharmacy’s 
response, and (d) determine how knowledgeable and involved the prospective respondent was 
with respect to the supplier. Most of the pharmacies had multiple suppliers of pharmaceutical 
products. To avoid pharmacies consistently selecting either their best or their worst supplier and 
to ensure variance on the type of supplier evaluated, the identification of the referent supplier on 
which the pharmacy answered the questionnaire was done randomly following a procedure 
similar to the Kish selection grid (Kish 1965). 
Following prescreening, pretested surveys with personalized cover letters were mailed to 
400 pharmacies. Follow-up letters were not sent. Questionnaires were received from 156 
pharmacies, with a response rate of 39 percent. The proportion of pharmacy types in our sample 
was not significantly different from that of the sampling frame obtained from the National 
Council of Prescription Drug Program files (Chi-squared = 0.658, p value = 0.542), which 
suggests that nonresponse bias does not pose a serious threat. The nonresponse bias was further 
evaluated by comparing the early respondents with late respondents using the Armstrong and 
Overton (1977) procedure for all constructs considered in this study. Since no significant 
differences (p > 0.10) were found, nonresponse bias did not appear to be a serious problem. In 
addition, questions measuring the respondent's degree of personal involvement (in the 
pharmacy's dealings with this wholesaler) and knowledgeability (in general about the pharmacy's 
dealings with this wholesaler) were included in the survey. The average levels of involvement 
and knowledgeability measured on a seven-point scale were 6.35 and 6.56 respectively, 
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indicating that the respondents were very involved with and knowledgeable about the suppliers, 
thus reducing the incidence of common methods variance. 
Measure Development 
 
Whenever possible, we attempted to use multi-item measures that had been utilized in previous 
studies. Where a new scale had to be developed, we were guided initially by the construct 
definitions and the scales utilized in organizational research. The resulting measures and scales 
were then modified after face-to-face and telephone interviews with pharmacy managers (see 
Appendix). 
Distributive fairness was assessed using five items developed by Kumar, Scheer, and 
Steenkamp (1995) and Price and Mueller (1986) but was modified based on interviews with 
retail pharmacies. The items require the pharmacy managers to assess, relative to several factors, 
the fairness of outcomes and earnings from carrying the wholesaler's line. The correlation 
between this scale and a global item of fairness is 0.71 (p < 0.0001), providing evidence of 
convergent validity. Procedural fairness items were adapted for this study from measures 
previously utilized by Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995). One item measuring each of the 
six principles of bilateral communication, impartiality, refutability, explanation, 
knowledgeability, and courtesy created the procedural fairness scale. The correlation between 
this scale and a global measure of overall fairness is 0.77 (p < 0.001), which shows a high level 
of convergent validity.  
Trust was defined as the perceived credibility and benevolence of a target (supplier) of 
trust (Ganesan 1994, Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp 1995). Thus, a two-dimensional construct of 
trust was developed, and the items were rendered from past studies (Ganesan 1994, Doney and 
Cannon 1997). For buyer's loyalty, we used a two-item scale based on the definition of conative 
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loyalty, which is characterized by repeat episodes of intent to rebuy from the supplier and is 
similar to motivation (see Appendix). Purchase volume (percentage of total annual dollar 
purchase from this particular wholesaler) was used as a control variable.   
Measurement Analysis 
We evaluated the psychometric properties of all constructs, by conducting a series of 
confirmatory factor analyses on the covariance matrices. The discriminant validity between the 
two fairness dimensions was also evaluated by including all distributive and procedural items in 
a single two-factor model. Similar analysis was performed for trust (credibility and 
benevolence). These measurement models are acceptable because the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) are close to or greater than the 0.90 recommended level. All 
first-order factor loadings were significant, demonstrating convergent validity. The minimum 
first-order t-value is 9.2. The composite reliability was 0.88 for procedural fairness, 0.86 for 
distributive fairness, 0.94 for trust (credibility), and 0.87 for trust (benevolence).  
The summary statistics for the measures are reported in Table 1. All of the independent 
and dependent variables are significantly intercorrelated at p < 0.01. The control variable, 
purchase volume, is significantly correlated at p < 0.05 with the ultimate outcome variable, buyer 
loyalty. Purchase volume is also significantly correlated at p < 0.05 with trust (benevolence), 
which serves as a mediating variable, as a penultimate outcome variable. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
For testing Hypothesis H1a-H1d, we compared the corresponding paths in the fully 
specified structural equations model in Figure 1. For example, for testing Hypothesis H1a, we 
compared: (1) PF  TC and (2) PF  TB, and for testing Hypothesis H1b we compared: (3) DF 
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 TB and (4) DF  TC. As shown in Table 2, each comparison was conducted as a chi-square 
difference test at 1 df where the compared paths of interest were constrained to be equal in one 
model but were freely estimated in the specified model. The chi-square difference in case of H1a 
and H1c is significant at p <0.0001 level, for H1b at p <0.01 and H1d at p < 0.05, indicating 
support for all four hypotheses. 
INSERT TABLE 2 AND FIGURE 1 HERE 
Hypotheses H2a and H2b were tested using the Baron and Kenny (1986) procedure, and 
the results are presented in Tables 3 and 4 respectively. First, we ran a regression with loyalty as 
the dependent variable and purchase volume as the independent (control) variable. Second, we 
estimated a direct model without any mediation variable (trust-credibility or trust-benevolence) 
and estimated direct effects of fairness on loyalty after controlling for the purchase volume. We 
then compared the direct effects with the corresponding coefficients from a mediating model that 
included the hypothesized trust variable (credibility or benevolence) as the mediating variable. A 
full mediation was indicated if the following conditions were met: (1) the direct effects model 
produced a significant effect on a given outcome (e.g., procedural fairness on loyalty), (2) the 
corresponding direct effect was reduced to nonsignificance after inclusion of the specified 
mediating variable, and (3) the mediator had a significant effect on the focal outcome (e.g., trust-
benevolence on loyalty). Mediation was not indicated when the direct effects remain virtually 
unchanged with the introduction of the mediating variables as in condition 2. Finally, partial 
mediation was indicated if the direct effects were reduced but did not become nonsignificant.  
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE 
As shown in Table 3, procedural fairness has a significant direct effect (beta = 0.491, p < 
0.0001) on loyalty. When trust-credibility is introduced in the equation, the results indicate that 
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the procedural fairness coefficient becomes less significant (beta = 0.337, p < 0.01) and the trust-
credibility coefficient (beta = 0.216, p < 0.05) is significant. Thus, H2a is not fully supported 
because trust-credibility partially (not fully) mediates the relationship between procedural 
fairness and loyalty.  
As seen in Table 4, distributive fairness has a direct significant effect (beta = 0.269 at p < 
0.001) on loyalty. When trust-benevolence is introduced in the equation, the distributive fairness 
coefficient becomes nonsignificant (beta = 0.137, ns) and the trust-benevolence coefficient (beta 
= 0.306, p < 0.001) is significant. Thus, Hypothesis H2b is supported because the distributive 
fairness-loyalty relationship is completely mediated by trust-benevolence. 
Though not part of our formal hypotheses, we also tested the remaining two mediating 
effects: a) trust-benevolence on the procedural fairness-loyalty relationship, and b) trust-
credibility on the distributive fairness-loyalty relationship. We did not find either of these 
mediating effects to be significant either fully or partially.  
 DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results provided support for the study hypotheses and have significant implications for 
supply chain research and practice. The study has several theoretical and managerial implications 
and suggests future research directions and limitations. 
Theoretical Implications 
 
This study examined the alignment between the two dimensions of trust with the two dimensions 
of fairness. We hypothesized and found that procedural fairness is more important for the 
“credibility” dimension of trust than the “benevolence” dimension. But, when we tested the 
impact of distributive fairness, we found that it had a stronger effect on the “benevolence” 
dimension of trust than the “credibility” dimension. This is an interesting result in view of the 
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literature, which suggests that, while the dimensions of trust are conceptually distinct, they may 
turn out to be so intertwined that they are operationally inseparable (Larzelere and Huston 1980). 
We found that both procedural and distributive fairness have clear differential effects on each 
dimension of trust (credibility and benevolence). This validates trust as a multidimensional 
concept, and antecedents to trust can influence different dimensions of trust differently.  
Further, we found that trust-credibility partially mediates the procedural fairness-loyalty 
relationship, and does not at all mediate the distributive fairness-loyalty relationship. Trust-
benevolence, however, fully mediates the distributive fairness-loyalty relationship, but does not 
mediate the procedural fairness-loyalty relationship. Again, we were able to parcel out the 
mediating effect of the two dimensions of trust separately, which extends the research on this 
topic one step further.  
Managerial Implications 
The findings of this study underscore the importance of both procedural and distributive aspects 
of fairness in channel or supply chain relationships but each plays a more prominent role for 
fostering a particular type of trust. Managers at the supplier end seeking to develop trusting 
relationships with their buyers need to demonstrate procedural and distributive fairness 
accordingly. Relationships founded on trust tend to garner buyers’ loyalty. The mediating role of 
trust is important for managers in understanding the process of developing loyal relationships in 
a supply chain.  
The results of this study also can benefit the supplier-buyer relationships in several ways. 
First, the results indicate that suppliers should consider procedural fairness to be more relevant 
than distributive fairness when attempting to establish the credibility aspect of trust. To foster the 
benevolence aspect of trust, which is based on the buyer’s belief that the supplier has intentions 
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beneficial to the buyer, they should focus more on distributive fairness. Second, by further 
developing and expanding the existing fairness-relationship quality (trust) model to include an 
outcome variable of loyalty, this study should create awareness among suppliers that developing 
trust is an important step toward creating a group of loyal buyers. The aforesaid findings could 
be generalized to any supplier-buyer setting except where there isn’t adequate buyer choice 
among suppliers.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
This study’s limitations could also serve as fertile ground for future research. First, this is a 
cross-sectional study, and, hence, measuring the dynamic nature of some of the constructs (such 
as trust) was not possible. Second, all the constructs were measured only from the buyer’s point 
of view. The supplier’s perspective is not assessed in this study. A third limitation concerns the 
generalizability of the results. The pharmaceutical channel is somewhat unique due to the 
product, the directed nature of the demand, and stringent government regulation.  Also, changes 
in technology, buying groups, and third-party payer influences are important factors that may 
limit the generalizability of the findings. Finally, an investigation of the antecedents to fairness 
promises to unearth additional insights as to how organizations can manage their customers' 
perceptions of distributive and procedural fairness and thereby enhance buyer trust and loyalty.  
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APPENDIX 
Measures  
 
Distributive Fairness: α = 0.86 
(4 items, 7-point Likert scale, "Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree") 
1. This wholesaler provides us fair gross margins on the purchases made from them. 
2. This wholesaler provides us a fair share of the earnings for the effort we have made to support their product 
lines. 
3. This wholesaler provides us fair prices compared to other pharmacies in our industry. 
4. This wholesaler provides us fair service levels for the investment we have made to support their product lines. 
 
Procedural Fairness: α = 0.88 
(6 items, 7-point Likert scale, "Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree") 
1. This wholesaler promotes bilateral communication with the pharmacies. 
2. This wholesaler does not differentiate but rather treats all pharmacies similarly. 
3. This wholesaler sometimes alters its policies in response to a pharmacy's objections. 
4. This wholesaler provides valid reasons for any changes in their policies affecting the pharmacies. 
5. This wholesaler makes great effort to learn local market conditions under which our pharmacies operate. 
6. This wholesaler treats the pharmacies with respect. 
 
Trust (Credibility): α = 0.94 
(6 items, 7-point Likert scale, "Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree") 
1. The wholesaler keeps promises it makes to our pharmacy. 
2. This wholesaler is reliable. 
3. If problems arise, this wholesaler is honest about the problems. 
4. This wholesaler has been consistent in terms of their policies. 
5. We are confident in the information that this wholesaler provides us. 
6. Whenever this wholesaler gives our pharmacy advice on our business operations, we know that they are sharing 
their best judgment. 
 
Trust (Benevolence): α = 0.87 
(5 items, 7-point Likert scale, "Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree") 
1. This wholesaler is genuinely concerned that our pharmacy achieves its goals. 
2. When making important decisions, this wholesaler considers our welfare before its own. 
3. This wholesaler considers our interests when problems arise. 
4. This wholesaler has gone out of its way to help us. 
5. This wholesaler has made sacrifices for us in the past. 
 
Buyer Loyalty: α = not applicable for two items 
(2 items, 7-point Likert scale, "Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree") 
1. We will not switch from this wholesaler at any cost.  
2. We will shift more business to this wholesaler. 
 
Purchase Volume 
What percentage of your total annual dollar purchase of prescription drugs do you obtain from this particular 
wholesaler?  _____% 
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TABLE 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations 
 
        Correlations  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variables    Mean SD  2 3 4 5 6         
 
1. Buyer Loyalty   4.45 1.19  0.370 0.549 0.556 0.534 0.186 
2. Distributive Fairness  5.17 1.07    0.714 0.584 0.612 0.072  
3. Procedural Fairness  4.42 1.12    0.780 0.694 0.025 
4. Trust (Credibility)   4.85 1.47   0.742 0.024 
5. Trust (Benevolence)  4.21 1.29      0.133 
6. Purchase Volume            84.47   25.34           - 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: All correlation coefficients > 0.36 are significant at p < 0.01, whereas correlation 
coefficients > 0.13 are significant at p < 0.05.  
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TABLE 2 
Structural Model Results 
 
         
Hypothesized Relationship  Chi-Squarediff dfdiff  Significance  
 
H1a. PFTC > PF TB  17.381   1  <0.0001 
H1b. DF TB > DF TC    8.575   1    0.003 
H1c. PF TC > DF TC  46.611   1  <0.0001    
H1d. DF TB > PF TB    3.911   1     0.045 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 3 
Mediating Role of Trust-credibility Between Procedural Fairness and Loyalty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables   Model 1   Model 2  Model 3 
Purchase Volume    .208**    .196**       .219*** 
Procedural Fairness           .491****              .337 ***   
Trust-credibility1             .216* 
 
Adjusted R-Square    .036         .275        .331 
F Statistic    6.49*             28.43****          20.965****  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
**** p < .0001, *** p < .001, ** p < .01, *p<.05 
1Mediating variable. 
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TABLE 4 
Mediating Role of Trust-benevolence Between Distributive Fairness and Loyalty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables   Model 1   Model 2  Model 3 
Purchase Volume    .208**    .182*        .117 
Procedural Fairness           .269***              .137   
Trust-benevolence1             .306*** 
 
Adjusted R-Square    .036         .102        .168 
F Statistic    6.490*               9.267****          10.761****  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
**** p < .0001, *** p < .001, ** p < .01, *p<.05 
1Mediating variable. 
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All coefficients are significant at p < 0.05. 
 
FIGURE 1 
Path Model of Fairness-Trust-Loyalty Relationships 
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